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HANSON, His Wife, 





STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff and appellant by its Complaint sought to 
have the court concel and terminate an Agreement TO 
Lease, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint and 
is made a part thereoff by reference, on three alleged 
grounds: (A) Failure of lessees to pay rent called for 
by the Agreement To Lease; (B) Failure to pay, before 
delinquency, utility bills incurred by lessees at the 
leased premises; and (C) Failure of lessees to pay, be-
fore delinquency, taxes levied on lessees' personal prop-
erty situated in the leased premises, through proceedings 
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initiated after defendants had paid all utility bills and 
all taxes levied on lessees' personal property, to date, 
and after defendants had tendered payment of all ar-
rearages in rent, and without the plaintiff and appellant, 
assignee of the original lessor, taking any steps or doing 
anything towards compliance with the requirements of 
Utah's "Unla\vful Detainer" statute 78-36-3 U.C.A. 1953, 
and in particular with subdivisions (3) and (5) thereof. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff and appellant filed, served and argued a 
Motion For Summary Judgment as prayed for in the 
plaintiff's Complaint, and the defendants and respond-
ents filed, served and argued a Motion For Summary 
Judgement of No Cause of Action in favor of the defend-
ants. The lower court thereafter and on June 28, 1969, 
made an Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and found, concluded and ordered as 
follows: "From the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
other documents on file herein and received in evidence, 
the court fmds and concludes that there is no genuine 
issue as to the material facts of this matter and that the 
defendants are entitled to judgment of no cause of action 
as a matter of law. Accordingly, it is so ORDERED, 
and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is 
granted." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the Order 
of the lower Court granting defendants' and respondents' 
Motion For Summary Judgment. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants and respondents are lessees of the prem-
ises described in the Complaint under and by virtue of a 
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document entitled Agreement To Lease, dated 10th day 
of April, 1961, a copy of which is attached to the Com-
plaint and is made a part thereof by reference. The lease 
is for a term of ten years beginning on the 30th day of 
l\Iay, 1961. 
On December 11, 1968, an instrument called NOTICE 
OF TERMINATION AND TO QUIT, signed by the plain-
tiff's attorney, a photostatic copy of which is attached 
to defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, was 
served on each of the defendants (Deposition of Parker 
G. Hanson pages 21 and 25). This instrument stated in 
substance that the Agreement To Lease and Agreement 
To Option therein referred to "is terminated and can-
celled on the grounds that you (the defendants) have 
failed to pay the lease payments as called for therein, 
have failed to pay utility bills as called for therein, and 
for other grounds." The instrument demanded that the 
defendants within 15 days quit said premises and deliver 
possessions of the same to American Holding Company or 
its authorized representative, or action would be taken 
for their removal. 
Prior to the time when said Notice Of Termination 
And To Quit was served upon the defendants, and on 
December 4, 1968, the defendants mailed to the plaintiff 
by U. S. certified mail in a sealed envelope addressed 
to the plaintiff at its address in St. George, Utah, and 
deposited in the mail box at the post office in St. George, 
Utah, a check made by the defendants to the plaintiff for 
all rentals which had become due from the defendants 
to the plaintiff under the Agreement To Lease, which had 
not theretofore been paid by the defendants to the 
plaintiff, namely, a check for all rentals for the period 
from March 1, 1968, to November 30, 1968, a period of 
eight months. (Parker G. Hanson's Deposition P. 6, 7, 20, 
:n - and D2fendants' Affidavit in Support of Defend-
ant's Motion for Summary Judgment Par. 7). Plaintiff 
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was given notice by the St. George postal authorities 
that the certified letter from the Parkers addressed to 
the plaintiff was at the post office being held for the 
plaintiff. The president of the plaintiff corporation, 
Maeser W. Terry, knew the certified letter was at the 
St. George post office and testified he had reason to be-
lieve and did believe that the envelope contained pay-
ment of the back rent owed by the Parkers to the plain-
tiff, and that he and the assistant secretary for the 
plaintiff, who usually called at the post office for plain-
tiff's mail, refused to take such certified letter out of 
the post office. (Maeser W. Terry's Deposition pages 9 
and 10, and Parker G. Hanson's Deposition pages 20, 21 
and 22). 
All rental which accrued prior to March 1, 1968, 
had been previously paid by the defendants and accepted 
by the plaintiff (Maeser Terry's Affidavit attached to 
plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment). 
On December 21, 1968, the certified letter, which had 
been mailed by defendants to plaintiff on December 4, 
1968, was returned "unclaimed" to the defendants. On 
December 24, 1968, the defendants approached the presi-
dent of the plaintiff corporation, Maeser W. Terry, at 
American Holding Company's office in St. George and 
offered to pay to him all past due rent owed by the de-
fendants to American Holding Company, either by check 
or by cash, which cash was exhibited and offered to him, 
providing he had any objection to taking defendants' 
check. The president of the plaintiff corporation refused 
to accept the same. Defendants made several other 
tenders of past due rent, and tenders of current monthly 
rentals as they became due for several months after De-
cember, 1968, both in the form of checks and currency, 
to the president of the plaintiff corporation, all of which 
said president of the plaintiff corporation refused to ac-
cept. (Parker G. Hanson's Deposition Pages 22, 23 and 
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first 9 lines of Page 24. Also last 16 lines of Page 7 and 
first J 6 lines of Page 8 of Deposition of Maeser W. Ter-
ry). Defendants in paragraph 4 of their Affidavit at-
tached to defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
made a continuing offer to pay into court for the plain-
tiff all back rental and all current rentals to become due 
under said Agreement To Lease. 
The utility bill which the plaintiff complains about. 
as not havingg been paid when due, is a bill of $97.34 for 
electric power used by the defendants at the leased 
p1,emises during the months of October and November, 
1968. These utility bills become due on the 15th day of 
the month next following the month during which they 
were incurred. This entire amount was paid by the de-
fendants to St. George City during the forenoon of De-
cember 11, 1968, before defendants were served with 
said "Notice of Termination and To Quit" which serv-
ice was made on the afternoon of December 11, 1968. 
(Parker G. Hanson's Deposition beginning at line 21 of 
Page 25 and ending with line 15 Page 26). This entire 
amount was paid about one month before plaintiff's 
Complaint was filed on January 10, 1969. 
The bill for taxes for the year 1968 in the amount 
of S97.56, levied on personal property owned by the de-
fendants situated on the leased premises, complained 
about by the plaintiff, became delinquent on November 
30, 1968 These taxes were paid in full on or about De-
cember 5, 1968, by defendants' check dated November 
30, 1968, but not mailed to the County Treasurer of 
Washington County until December 4, 1968. (Parker 
G. Hanson's Deposition beginning with line 10, Page 9 
and ending with line 22, Page 9). This was some six days 
before plaintiff served said "Notice of Termination and 
To Quit" on the defendants, and more than a month 
prior to the filing of plaintiff's Complaint on January 
10, 1969. 
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No notice in writmg was ever given by the plain-
tiff to the defendants as required by Section 78-36-3(3) 
U.C.A. 1953, pertaining to alleged failure of defendants 
to pay rent when due, and no notice in writing was ever 
given by the plaintiff to the defendants as required by 
Section 78-36-3 (5) U.C.A. 1953, pertaining to the alleged 
failure of the defendants to pay utility bills incurred by 
them at the leased premises when due, or pertaining to 
the claimed failure of the defendants to pay taxes on 
defendants' pExsonal property situated on the leased 
premises when due (Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of defendants' 
Affidavit attached to defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment). These statements were sworn to by the de-
fendants under oath and stand uncontradicted. 
ARGUMENT 
It is the position of the defendants and respondents 
that when the facts above set forth had been establish-
ed of record by the pleadings, the depositions, affidavits 
and other documents on file herein, that the defendants 
were entitled to an Order granting their Motion For a 
Summary Judgment of No Cause of Action, as was made 
by the lower court. 
It is the law in Utah that unless a lessee for a def-
inite term specifically waives in the lease his right to 
the same, that the landlord must give the tenant written 
notice and make written demand for the payment of 
alleged past due rent, specifying the rental which the 
landlord claims is in default, and demand in the alter-
native that the tenant pay the past due rent or surren-
der the demised premises within three days, and that 
such demand remain uncomplied with for three days 
after service of such notice and demand, before the 
landlord can maintain an action for cancellation of the 
lease and for an order ousting the tenant from the 
premises. 78-36-3 (3) U.C.A. 1953. 
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King v. Firm. - 285 P 2d 1114; 3 U. 2d 419 
4. A landlord may not, without express consent of 
tenant, repossess property without resorting to remedies 
provided in forcible entry and detainer statute. 
Black v. McLendon - 308 P 2d 300 (Okl. 1957) 
4. Right to elect to forfeits for nonpayment of rent 
does not arise until demand for rent has been made and 
payment refused, unless waiver of demand for payment 
of rent is provided for by lease. 
5. Under lease providing that tenant waived notice 
of election to forfeit and demand of possession, land-
lord had no right to declare lease forfeited for nonpay-
ment of rent, vvithout demanding payment of rent due. 
Note: By the terms of the least in this Oklahoma 
case, the lessee waived notice of almost everything (see 
wording of the Lease), but did not expressly waive de-
mand for payment of delinquent rent, and the court 
held that without such demand having been made and 
having not been complied with for the statutory period, 
that a suit for cancellation of the lease and for an order 
ousting the tenant from the property could not be 
maintained. 
The Lease in our case contained no provision vvhere-
in or whereby the tenants (defendants herein) waived 
the requirements of the Utah statute above cited (78-
36-3 (3) U.C.A. 1953. In fact the provision of this Lease 
relating to the termination for nonpayment of rent ex-
pressly provides for termination of the Lease only by 
proper notice of such breach. Proper notice means the 
notice required by the Utah statute. The full provision 
of the Lease in our case relating to termination for non-
payment of rent in Paragraph 6 as follows' "6. In the 
event the Hansons fail, neglect or refuse to pay the 
rentals as above set forth, the company may terminate 
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this lease by proper notice of said breach, or may con-
sider the lease in full force and effect and proceed by 
legal means to collect the same, and any costs incurred 
in so doing, including reasonable attorney's fee, shall 
be paid by Hansons." Clearly there is no waiver of the 
notice aid demand required by the Utah Statute above 
quoted, contained in said Agreement To Lease. The 
Lease in our case expressly requires proper notice be 
given, and nowhere therein did the lessees waive the de-
mand in the alternative required by the Utah statute. 
The document entitled "Notice of Termination and 
to Quit" which was served on the defendants in our case 
clearly did not comply with the requirements of the 
Utah Statute 78-36-3(3) U. C. A. 1953 perta:ining to the 
cancellation of the Lease for nonpayment of rentals 
when due. In substance it stated, your Lease is termin-
ated and cancelled and you are given 15 days to quit 
and deliver possession of the leased premises to Ameri-
can Holding Company or court action will be taken for 
your removal. 
It is odvious why the plaintiff and appellant did not 
wish to comply with the requirements of the Utah stat-
ute above cited, by giving the defendants notice in writ-
ing of the rent which plaintiff claimed was past due 
and remained unpaid, and demanding in the alternative 
that the defendants either pay the rent or surrender 
the leased premises within three days. The president and 
assistant secretary of the plaintiff had received a 
written notice from the post office at St. George that it 
had a certified letter from the Parkers addressd to 
American Holding Company which they had refused on 
advice of plaintiff's counsel to take out of the post office, 
and which the president of the plaintiff corporation 
testified he had reason to believe and did believe con-
tained the past due rent money. (Maeser W. Terry's De-
position Pages 9 and 10). The officers of the plaintiff 
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knew that if the plaintiff served the notice and demand 
required by the Utah Statute on the defendants that 
they would have immediately inquired why the plain-
tiff had not received the check covering full payment of 
all past due rent, which had been mailed to the plain-
tiff by certified mail, and upon learning of their refusal 
to accept the certified mail, they would have again ten-
dered to the plaintiff the entire past due rent, both in 
the form of defendants' check and in cash, as the de-
fendants did promptly after the postal authorities had 
informed the defendants that American Holding Com-
pany had refushed to accept the certified letter and had 
returned the same to the defendants. 
The Agreement To Lease is silent pertaining to any 
right of the lessor to cancel and terminate the Lease for 
nonpayment of utility bills incuffed by the lessee, 
promptly when due, or for nonpayment of taxes on the 
lessees' personal propeTty situated on the leased prem-
ises, promptly when due. The Lease most certainly con-
tains no waiver, by the lessees, of the necessity of com-
plience by the lessor, or its assigns, with the require-
ments of Utah's unlawful detainer statute applicable 
thereto, before an action could be maintained by the 
lessor on either of these grounds. The applicable provi-
sion of our statute is 78-36-3 (5) \vhich provides substan-
tially that a landlord who wishes to cancel a lease for 
a term of years, on grounds other than those therein-
before mentioned, that such landlord must give the ten-
ant notice in writing specifying the default complained 
of and demanding in the alternative that the tenant 
correct the default or surrender possession of the prem-
ises within three days. That the tenant within three 
days after the service of such notice upon him, may 
perform such condition or covenant and thereby 
the lease from forfeiture. 
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Obviously the "Notice of Termination and To Quit" 
which was served on the defendants did not meet the 
requirements of the applicable statute. 
As heretofore pointed out all utility bills incurred 
by the lessees at the leased premises, and all taxes lev-
ied on the personal property of the lessees situated on 
the leased premises had all been paid, although a little 
late, before the document entitled "Notice of Termina-
tion and To Quit" was served upon the defendants, and 
approximately one month before the Complaint was 
filed on January 10, 1969. 
Forfeitures of Leases or other contracts are not 
favored, either in law or in equity, and provisions relat-
ing thereto should be strictly construed against the par-
ty seeking to invoke such forfeitures. The following 
cases support this rule: 
VAN ZYVERDEN v. FARRAR. - 393 P 2d 468; 15 UT 2d 
367. 
3. Unlawful detainer statutes provide severe remedy 
and must be strictly complied with before cause of ac-
tion thereunder may be maintained. U.C.A. 1953, 78-36-3. 
'.\1URPHY v. TRAYNOR. - 135 P 2d 230; 110 Col. 466. 
2. Provisions for forfeitures in contracts, such as 
leases, are not favored either in law or in equity and 
are to be strictly construed against party seeking to 
invoke the forfeitures. 
HOWARD M. SWAIN et ux v. SALT LAKE REAL ES-
T A TE AND INVESTMENT COMPANY - 279 P 2d 709; 
3 Ut. 2d 121. 
2. Contracts 318. Equity is loath to enforce a for-
feiture, especially when refusal to do so gives all parties 
to agreement every right to which they are entitled, 
and thus works no hardship upon anyone. 
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The defendants still stand willing and ready to pay 
into court for the plaintiff, or to pay direct to the plain-
tiff all rents vvhich have accrued under the Agreement 
To Lease ancl which remain unpaid, as soon as the 
plaintiff will accept the same. It would work a great 
hardship on the defendants to have this Lease cancelled, 
including their Option to Rene\', for an ten 
years, executed simultaneously therewith entitled 
"Agreement To Option" referred to rn plaintiff's "Not-
ice of Termination and To Quit" hereinabove referred to. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time plamtiff and appellant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, and defendants and respondents' 
Motion For Summary Judgment, \Vere argued and sub-
mitted to the lower court for its decision, it was estab-
lished by the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and other 
documents on file and received in evidence, and now 
constituting the record on appeal, that there is no gen-
uine issue as to any material fact of this case, and that 
the plaintifi had no legal right to maintain this action 
or to thE' reliet demanded, and that the defendants were 
entitled 1o have a Summary Judgment of No Cause of 
Action entered in the:ir favor, and defendants and re-
spondents respectfully request that the decision of the 
Honorable District Judge in so finding, concluding, and 
granting Summary Judgment of No Cause of Action in 
favor of the defendants be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted 
DURHAM MORRIS 
First Security Bank Bldg., 
Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
